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I.
1.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE
This appeal asks the Court to decide whether the district court properly exercised

discretion in determining and awarding attorney fees to J-U-B. BECO's conclusory allegations
that the court abused its discretion are amply contradicted by the record. A reading of the district
court's decision demonstrates that the court conducted a reasoned analysis of the evidence and
considered the relevant factors under I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) before awarding J-U-B attorney fees in
the amount of $41,140.
In 2008, this Court remanded the fee issue back to the district court with instructions to
determine and award fees to J-U-B for defending against BECO's breach of contract claim.
Even though the district tout followed this Court's instructions and acted within its discretion in
awarding fees to J-U-B, BECO refuses to accept the decision and argues that J-U-B is not
entitled to any fees. Losing twice on summary judgment, once on appeal, and once after remand,
particularly where powerful evidence supported each decision, by no means furnishes a basis for
BECO to attaclc the credibility of the district court by alleging that it acted out of vindication for
its own sense of justice in awarding J-U-B additional fees.
BECO's original lawsuit claimed that J-U-B had delayed BECO's work on a construction
project, thereby subjecting BECO to liability for liquidated damages.

J-U-B successfully

defended itself on all claims at the district court and was awarded attorney fees in the amount of
$75,351.42 which prompted BECO's first appeal.
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That appeal resulted in this Court's decision in BECO Const. Co., Inc. v. J-U-B

Engineers, Inc. 145 Idaho 719 (2008) to affirm the district court's summary judgment order and
partially remand the fee award for a determination and award of fees to J-U-B for defending
against the contract claim. On remand, the district court complied with the directions from this
Court by awarding J-U-B attorney fees, with interest, in the amount of $35,600 for defending
against the breach of contract claim and then awarded J-U-B an additional $5,540 for costs and
fees incurred in preparing additional briefing on the issue at BECO's insistence. In reaching its
decision, the district court revisited the existing record and considered, at a minimum, the expert
testimoily of John Bailey, the complexity of the issues, the experience of counsel for J-U-B, the
reasonableness of the hourly rate charged, the nature of the work performed, and the objections
raised by BECO,'~ coupled with the briefing and oral argument of counsel. By properly
considering the evidence in the record and the factors outlined in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3), the court
showed that it understood the issue as one of discretion, that it acted within the bounds of that
discretion, and that it exercised reason in awarding fees to J-U-B.
2.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
The introduction to the district court's June 12, 2008 Memorandum Decision and Order

provides a succinct chronology of the major events in the bistory of this case.3 In summary,
BECO's original complaint was against the City of PocatelIo and J-U-B as codefendants,

' See Clerk's Record ARer Remand, p. 65.
Consistent with Appellant's Brief, this brief shall reference the Clerk's Record after remand as "Clerk's Record
After Remand" since the Clerk's Record ARer Remand has no volume designation. See Appellant's Brief at
footnote 1 and Clerk's Record After Remand, p. 65.
'See Clerk's Record After Remand, pp. 37-39.
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claiming breach of contract with regard to both defendants, negligence with regard to both
defendants, and intentional interference against J-u-B.~The City settled with and BECO shortly
after the suit was filed. J-U-B then filed its first summary judgment motion and supporting
memorandum prompting BECO to withdraw its breach of contract claim just before the hearing
after J-U-B pointed out in the briefing that there was no direct contractual relationship between
the two parties and BECO was not a third party beneficiary to the contract J-U-B had entered
' a result of that motion, the court ruled in J-Uwith the Pocatello Development ~ u t h o r i t ~ .As
B's favor on the negligence claim but denied summary judgment on the intentional interference
with contract claim.6
Then, after receiving and reviewing BECO's discovery responses, J-U-B filed a second
~ reviewing the late
summary judgment motion and memorandum in support of the r n o t i ~ n .After
discovery, J-U-B learned that BECO's project notes directly contradicted the statements BECO's
witness had made in his affidavit opposing J-U-B's first summary judgment motion.' The court
ruled in J-U-B's favor on the second summary judgment motion and then awarded J-U-B
attorney fees.g BECO appealed this decision and asked this Court to reverse the second
summary judgment order and fee award. This Court affirmed the summary judgment order and
partially vacated the fee award by remanding the issue back to the district court for a

4

R. Vol. I, pp. 1-23.
R. Vol. I, pp. 33-53.
6
R. Vol. 111, pp.481-500.
7
R. Vol. 111, pp. 533-553.
'R. Vol. 111, pp. 533-553.
R. Vol. 111, pp. 650-678.
5

RESPONDENT'S BRlEF - 3

determination and award of fees to J-U-B for defending against the breach of contract claim.

BECO Const. Co., Inc. v. J-U-B Engineers, Inc. 145 Idaho 719 (2008).
Subsequently, BECO filed a motion to release its cash deposit from the district court and
a hearing was held on the issue.1° At the hearing, the court expressed its perception that this
Court had instructed it to determine and award attorney fees to J-U-B and that it would take the
issue of releasing the cash deposit under advisement and issue a ruling." BECO then argued that
it needed to have the opportunity to prepare additional briefing on the fee issue.'' J-U-B argued
that the record was replete with evidence that would allow the court to determine and award fees
to J-U-B for defending against the breach of contract claim and to require additional briefing
would constitute a waste of time and resources for both the court and the parties.'3 The court
allowed BECO the chance to file a brief but informed it that it would be responsible for the cost
of J-U-B's brief.14
The court then entered a decision denying BECO's request to release all of the cash
deposit, ruling that it would be inappropriate to release the funds until the court had determined
the appropriate award of fees to J-U-B.'~ Finally, the district court entered a decision which
prompted this appeal by awarding J-U-B fees in the amount of $35,600 for defending the
contract claim, $5,540 for researching and preparing the additional briefing on the fee issue, and

10

See Clerk's Record After Remand, pp. 16.
TI. Vol. I, pp. 20-25.
I2
Tr. Vol. I, pp. 20-25.
Tr. Vol. I, pp. 20-25.
Tr. Vo1. I, pp. 20-25.
Is See Clerk's Record After Remand, pp. 37-42.
II

'
''
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ordering that J-U-B be paid from the funds on deposit with the court, the balance to be remitted
to BECO.'~

STATEMENT OF FACTS

3.

This Court's prior decision in BECO Const Co., Inc. v. J-U-B Engineers, Inc. 145 Idaho

719 (2008), partially remanded the issue of attorney fees back to the district court for a
determination and award of fees to J-U-B for defending itself against BECO's breach of contract
claim. The district court had previously awarded costs and fees to J-U-B in the amount of
$75,398.42.17 Prior to the award, the court had conducted a hearing on the attorney fees issue
and J-U-B had presented evidence in support of the award which included billing recordsI8,
testimony from experienced Idaho attorney, John ~ a i l e y ' ~an, affidavit of counsel in support of
the awardz0, a Memorandum of Costs and ~ees'', a Memorandum in Support of Motion for

Attorney Fees and Sanction.?', and oral argument from counselz3. BECO filed a brief opposing
the award but did not present any evidence to counter the testimony from Mr.
Afler the remand, the district court held a hearing on BECO's motion to release its cash
deposit. At this hearing, the court heard argument from both sides over releasing the case
~
argued that the record contained
deposit and also about awarding attomey fees to J - u - B . ~ J-U-B

see Clerk's Record After Remand, p. 66.
IV, p. 816.
R. Vol. IV, pp. 687-708.
'%ee Clerk's Record After Remand, pp. 26-29.
R. Vol. IV, pp. 780-782.
R. Vo1. IV, pp. 681-686.
R. Vol. IV, pp. 709-715.
See Clerk's Record After Remand, pp. 24-3 1.
Z4 R. Vol. IV, pp. 739-754.
25 T. Vol. I, pp. 8-25.
l6

" R. Vol.

''
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enough information to allow the district court to determine and award J-U-B its fees for
defending against the contract claim.26 J-U-B further argued that up to the point that the breach
of contract claim was dismissed, the fees incurred by J-U-B were for defending against the
breach of contract claim and J-U-B should be awarded such fees.27 BECO argued that J-U-B
needed to specifically explain and expound upon the entries in its billing records and that it
needed to prepare additional briefing on the issue.'*

The court advised the parties to file

simultaneous briefs on the attorney fees issue and advised J-U-B to also file a cost bill for the
additional fees for having to file the brief.29

11.
1.

DISCUSSION

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Attorney fees are awarded in the sound discretion of the trial court, and the party refuting

the award must show an abuse of discretion by the trial court. Graham v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co,, 138 Idaho 611, 613 (Idaho 2003). When this Court reviews an alleged abuse of

discretion by a trial court, the sequence of inquiry is: (I) whether the trial court correctly
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the outer
boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific
choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by the exercise of
reason. The test for abuse of discretion concerns whether the trial court correctly perceived the
issue as one of discretion, acted within the boundaries of its discretion consistent with the legal
26

T. Vol. I, pp. 16-17.
T. Vol. I, pp. 22-23.
28
T. Vol. I, pp. 18-21.
29 T. Vo1. I, pp. 24-25.
27
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standards applicable to the specific choices available to it, and whether the trial court reached its
decision by an exercise of reason. Thornson v. Olsen, 205 P.3d 1235, 1239 (2009), (citing Weeks

v. E. Idaho Health Servs., 143 Idaho 834, 837 (2007)).
2.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY PERCEIVED THE ISSUE OF
DETERMINING AND AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES TO J-U-B AS ONE
OF DISCRETION AND PROPERLY ACTED WITHING THE BOUNDS
ITS DISCRETION BY CONSIDERING THE EVIDENCE BEFORE IT
AND EXERCISING REASON IN REACHING ITS DECISION.
A.

The district court satisfied all three parts of the abuse of discretion test.

As stated above, the abuse of discretion test has three parts. The first requires that the
court correctly perceive the issue as one of discretion. During the June 9, 2008 hearing on

Plaintifs Motion for Release of Cash Deposit, the district court pointed out to counsel by
quoting partly from this Court's prior decision that:
"...Idaho Code 12-120(3) does not provide the basis for the key award to J-U-B
after the point where the contractual claim was dismissed. Up to that point, J-U-B
is entitled to its fees for defending against the contract claim. So, the issue isn't
whether or not they're entitled to fees; that has already been resolved by the Idaho
Supreme Court. The only issue is the amount.. . .,JO
This statement shows that the district court correctly perceived the decision to determine and
award attorney fees to J-U-B for defending against the breach of contract claim as not only
within its discretion, but as the only reason this Court remanded the case to the district court. In
taking the issue of releasing the cash under advisement and then advising the parties to submit
additional briefing on the attorney fee issue, the court's actions are consistent with this perceived
discretion.
3%ee Tr. Vol. I, p.13.
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The second and third parts of the abuse of discretion test require that the court act within
the boundaries of its discretion consistent with the legal standards applicable to the specific
choices available to it, and reach its decision by an exercise of reason. In meeting these two
parts of the test, the court properly considered the factors of I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) and exercised
reason in reaching its decision to award fees to J-U-B
In Idaho, the method of calculating reasonable attorney fees is set forth in Idaho Rule of
Civil Procedure 54(e)(3). Monsanto Co. v. Paczj?Corp, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27565 (D. Idaho
Apr. 24, 2006). I.R.C.P. Rule 54(e)(3) requires the court to consider the following factors in
determining the amount of attorney fees:
In the event the court grants attorney fees to a party or parties in a civil action it
shall consider the following factors in determining the amount of such fees:
(A)

The time and labor required.

(B)

The novelty and difficulty of the questions.

(C)

The skill requisite to perform the legal service properly and the experience
and ability of the attorney in the particular field of law.

(D)

The prevailing charges for like work.

(E)

Whether the fee is fixed or contingent

(F)

The time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances of the
case.

(G)

The amount involved and the results obtained.

(H)

The undesirability of the case.

(I)

The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.
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(J)

Awards in similar cases.

(K)

The reasonable cost of automated legal research (Computer Assisted Legal
Research), if the court finds it was reasonably necessary in preparing a
party's case.

(L)

Any other factor which the court deems appropriate in the particular case

The language of the court's Memorandum Decision and Order dated October 29, 2008
provides insight into how the court reached its decision. It shows that the court considered most,
if not all, of the twelve factors laid out under this rule before reaching its decision that the fees JU-B incurred prior to BECO withdrawing its contract claim were incurred defending against that

In reaching its decision, the court reconsidered the testimony of J-U-B's expert witness.
At the August 7, 2006 fee hearing, the court considered the testimony of Pocatello attorney John
~ a i l e Mr.
~ . Bailey
~ ~ was a witness called by J-U-B. He stated, that among other things, the
work done and the rate charged by J-U-B's counsel was reasonable and that the summary
judgment decisions in this case were well reasoned.33 He also stated that in his opinion BECO's
complaint was not well r e ~ e a r c h e d .The
~ ~ court questioned both Mr. Bailey and counsel for J-UB about the nature of defending a lawsuit of this type. Mr. Bailey further opined on the nature of
defending against a construction case and also about defending specifically against BECO,
concluding that litigation against BECO is difficult and unreasonably time consuming.35

31

See Clerk's Record
See Clerk's Record
13
See Clerk's Record
j 4 See Clerk's Record
See Clerk's Record
32

"

After Remand, pp. 65-66.
After Remand, p. 65.
After Remand, pp. 26-27 at pp. 24-27.
After Remand, p. 27 at pp. 25-26.
After Remand, pp. 26-27 at pp. 24-27.
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In reaching its decision, the court considered the volumes of documents J-U-B's counsel
had to review in defending the case. The underlying case beneath this appeal involved a
document intensive construction case which resulted in time consuming document review at the
initial stages. When J-U-B was first served the complaint it had no idea why it was being sued.
J-U-B knew it hadn't contracted with BECO. As explained at length in the briefing done for the
first appeal, there were two separate contracts; a design contract between J-U-B and the
Pocatello Development Authority and a construction contract between BECO and the City of
Pocatello. J-U-B could not comprehend why BECO would sue J-U-B in contract. These
concerns all had to be sorted out by J-U-B's counsel and explained to the court through summary
judgment briefs.
The court also considered the billing records showing the work done by J-U-B's counsel.
J-U-B presented the court with evidence to support an award of fees. BECO presented no
evidence at the fee hearing to refute Mr. Bailey's testimony or to establish that J-U-B's fees were
in any way unreasonable. J-U-B apportioned its fees by arguing to the court that the amount of
fees incurred by J-U-B prior to BECO withdrawing its breach of contract claim were all incurred
to defend the breach of contract claim. The work J-U-B's counsel did at the beginning of this
case was necessary to defend the lawsuit and would have been done regardless if there was one
claim or three. Regardless of whether J-U-B separated out each individual time entry and
labeled it as being spent defending against the contract claim, the court was capable of reviewing
the billing records and considering all of the factors outlined by I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) and reaching a
decision which is exactly what it did.
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In the alternative, if this Court disagrees with the district court's decision that the work
done by J-U-B was done defending against the contract claim, the Court could hold that the same
result could have been reached if the district court had held that BECO's unjustifiable claims
were made and pursued frivolously. This Court chose to apply the "right result/wrong reason"
test in its previous opinion in this case by holding that because J-U-B was not a stranger to the
construction contract between BECO and the City of Pocatello, J-U-B could not have interfered
with the contract. Beco Constr. Co. v. J-U-B Eng'rs, Inc., 145 Idaho 719, 724 (2008). It is clear
that J-U-B's billing records did not change from when they were first submitted to the court. It
is also clear that Mr. Bailey's testimony that BECO's complaint was not well researched and that
the case was brought and pursued frivolously did not change. The district court considered both
of these pieces of evidence, along with the rest of the record, before reaching its decision.
In addition to the testimony of Mr. Bailey and the billing records, the court also reviewed
the Memorandum of Costs filed by counsel for J-U-B, the Memorandum in Support, and
BECO's

objection^.^^ In support of the Memorandum of Costs, J-U-B filed and Afidavdt of

Counsel Regarding Memorandum of Costs and Fees which further supported the claim that the
attorney's fees incurred by J-U-B were incurred at a reasonable rate and in accordance with the
fees charged by attorneys with similar skill and experience, and the other factors laid out in
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3).37 Adding all of this together, BECO's argument that J-U-B provided the court
with no evidence or that the court had no evidence to consider before making its decision to

36

37

See Clerk's Record After Remand, p. 66.
R. Vo1. IV. p. 78 1.
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award fees to J-U-B is baseless. The court properly considered the evidence and made a
reasoned decision. Thus, this Court should uphold the district court's resulting decision.

B.

The district court did not award additional fees to "vindicate its own sense of
justice" as BECO argues.

At the hearing on BECO's motion to release the cash deposit, BECO argued that J-U-B
was not entitled to any fees because the record contained inadequate evidence to support an
award. J-U-B argued that the court had ample evidence to determine and make an award of fees.
BECO wanted to have a separate hearing on the fee issue and insisted on having the opportunity
~ court allowed BECO
to file additional briefing on the issue over the objection by J - u - B . ~The
the opportunity to brief the issue and ordered J-U-B to submit additional briefing on the issue
~ the court determined that J-U-B was
along with a cost bill that would be paid by B E C O . ~Thus,
the prevailing party and acted within its discretion in awarding the additional fees to J-U-B.
All the court did by allowing additional briefing was give BECO an opportunity to
establish its failing claim. BECO paid lip service to both the court's authority and the fact that it
was really only arguing about the amount of fees, but in reality, it was raising the issue of J-UB's entitlement to the fee and advising the court that any decision other than one that satisfied
BECO would likely be appealed.
J-U-B, on the other hand, argued that sufficient evidence existed in the record to support
an award of reasonable fees. A party claiming attorney fees does not even have to submit

evidence as to what is a reasonable fee.
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What is a reasonable attorneys' fee is a question for the determination of the
court, taking into consideration of the nature of the litigation, the amount involved
in the controversy, the length of time utilized in preparation for and the trial of the
case and other related factors viewed in the light of the knowledge and experience
of the court as a lawyer and judge; it is not necessary in the connection that he
hear any evidence on the matter although it is proper that the court may have
before it the opinion of experts. Smith v. Great Basirz Gmin Co., 98 Idaho 266,
281 (1977).
The court clearly understood its role in all of this. It understood that it was directed to determine
and award fees to J-U-B for defending against the contract claim by this Court. And because JU-B claimed that it could do that by looking back at the evidence contained in the record and
making a decision that meant that the court should go back and review the evidence in the record
and attempt to make such a determination and award. However, because BECO was arguing that
it needed the opportunity to file additional briefing, the court allowed BECO that opportunity at
the cost of the work incurred by J-U-B. Allowing the parties to file additional briefing, then
reviewing the existing record to determine and award fees to J-U-B was not done with any
vindictive intent of punishing BECO; rather, it was squarely within the courts discretion and
should be upheld.
C.

The district court properly considered the factors of I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3).

The court's decision to award fees to J-U-B also stated that due to the objections raised
by counsel for BECO and BECO's Petition for a Writ of Mandate against the court it was
necessary for J-U-B to incur additional attorney fees in seeking an award on the contract claim
for which J-U-B should be compensated in the amount of $5,540.~' Again, the court made this

40

See Clerk's Record After Remand, p. 66.
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decision by employing the factors laid out in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) and exercising its discretion. The
district court's decision clearly demonstrates that it considered at least some ofthe twelve factors
laid out under Rule 54(e)(3). It is well settled by this Court that I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) does not
require the district court to make detailed findings on each listed factor. The rule merely
provides that the district court shall consider the factors, but does not require a finding on each
one, as a particular listed factor may or may not be relevant to the outcome. Elliott v. Darwin

Neibaur Farms, 138 Idaho 774, 786 (2003) US. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Kuenzli, 134 Idaho 222,
228-29, 999 P.2d 877, 883-84 (2000); Perkins v. US. Transformer West, 132 Idaho 427,431-32,
974 P.2d 73, 77-78 (1999); Post Falls Trailer Park v. Fredekind, 131 Idaho 634, 638, 962 P.2d
1018, 1022 (1998); Empire Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. North Pacific Ins. Co., 127 Idaho 716,
720,905 P.2d 1025, 1029 (1995); Brinkman v. Aid Ins. Co., 115 Idaho 346,351,766 P.2d 1227,
1232 (1988); Irwin Rogers Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Murphy, 122 Idaho 270, 277, 833 P.2d 128, 135
(Ct.App. 1992). This Court has further held that a trial court need not make specific findings
demonstrating how it employed any of the factors listed in Rule 54(e)(3) but it should provide a
record establishing that it considered the factors under the rule. Pinnacle Eng'rs v. Heron Brook,

LLC., 139 Idaho 756, 760 (2004), See also Perki~sv. US. Transformer West, 132 Idaho 427
(1999), and Elliot v. Darwin Neibaur Farms, 138 Idaho 774, 2003 Ida. Lexis 60 (2003). In the

Pinnacle case, the Court also cited its decision in Elliott v. Darwin Neibaur Farms, 138 Idaho
774, 786 (2003) where it held that it is sufficient if the trial court states that it has taken into
consideration the factors listed in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3). In Pinnacle, the district coult's written order
simply stated, "The court awards attorney's fees in the amount of $61,846.38." Pinnacle Eng'rs
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v. Heron Brook, LLC., 139 Idaho 756,760 (2004). Here, the district court specifically mentioned
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) factors in its decision to award fees to J-U-B.
This Court has previously upheld awards of attorney fees where the record indicates that
the trial court considered the relevant factors even though it did not make any reference to the
rule when making the award. In Brinkman v. Aid Insurance Co., 115 Idaho 346,766 P.2d 1227
(1988), the trial court awarded attorney fees in an amount roughly equal to the contingent fee the
prevailing party had contracted to pay his attorneys. When making the award in Brinkman, the
trial court mentioned only that the attorney fee was contingent and did not make any reference to
Rule 54(e)(3) or to the other factors listed in that rule. This Court upheld the award, however,
"because the record establishes that several of the eleven factors were argued and briefed to the
court and there is no basis to conclude the court failed to consider each of the factors." Id This
Court has m h e r added that the profile of the record provided enough information to presume
that the trial judge considered the other pertinent factors enumerated in the [rule]." Pinnacle

Eng'rs v. Heron Brook, LLC., 139 Idaho 756, 760 (2004). These holdings are consistent with
how the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho has applied the factors of I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3)
when applying Idaho state law. That court held that "although these factors must be considered,
it is not required that specific findings be made as to how the factors were employed or applied
in making an award of fees. SemMaterials, L.P. v. Alliance Asphalt, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15470 (D. Idaho Mar. 1, 2007). These cases show that the district court in this case properly
exercised its discretion and explained its findings adequately.
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Here, the district court clearly demonstrated that it properly considered the Rule 54(e)(3)
factors in reaching its decision by explicitly mentioning them in its decision. This provides
convincing evidence that the court properly viewed its decision to determine and award fees to JU-B as within its discretion, that it properly acted within the bounds of that discretion, and
certainly exercised reason it reaching its decision to award J-U-B fees in the amount of $41,140.
Therefore, this Court should uphold the district court's decision.

3.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DENIED BECO'S MOTION FOR
RELEASE OF THE CASH DEPOSIT AND CORRECTLY ORDERED THAT
RELEASING IT BEFORE DETERMINING A PROPER FEE AWARD WOULD
BE INAPPROPRIATE UNDER THE APPLICABLE RULES.
A.

The district court properly interpreted I.A.R. 13(b)(15), and I.R.C.P. 67 and
79(e) in making its decision to retain the cash deposit, determine and make
an award of fees to J-U-B as required by this Court, and then returning the
balance of the deposit to BECO.

In its June 12, 2008 Memorandum Decision and Order the district court properly
considered and denied BECO's motion to release the cash deposit. In ruling on the motion, the
court looked to I.A.R. 13(b)(15), I.R.C.P. 67 and I.R.C.P. 79(e). While the application of a
procedural rule is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review, in this case the
district court's application of the applicable rules does not reach the level of reversible error.
Zenner v. Holcomb, 210 P.3d 552, 558 (2009).
Rule 13(b) of the Idaho Appellate Rules governs the powers of the district court during
the pendency of an appeal. The district court stated that I.A.R. 13(b)(15) is the subsection
relevant to this action and it states in pertinent part:

(b) Stay Upon Appeal - Powers of District Court - Civil Actions.
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In civil actions, unless prohibited by order of the Supreme Court, the district court
shall have the power and authority to rule upon the following motions and to take
the following actions during the pendency on an appeal;

...

(15) Stay execution or enforcement of a money judgment upon the posting of a
cash deposit ...which must be in the amount of the judgment or order, plus 36% of
such amount. ...Any bond filed pursuant to this rule shall state that the company
issuing or executing the same agrees to pay on behalf of the appellant all sums
found to be due and owing by the appellant by reason of the outcome of the
appeal, within 30 days of the filing of the remittitur from the Supreme Court, up
to the full amount of the bond or undertaking.
I.R.C.P. 67 provides for the making of cash deposits with the court and states:
In an action in which any part of the relief sought is a judgment for a sum of
money or the disposition of a sum of money or the disposition of any other thing
capable of delivery, a party, upon notice to every other party and by leave of
court, may deposit with the court all or any part of such sum or thing. When it is
admitted by the pleading, or shown upon the examination of a party, that a party
has possession, or control of, any money or other thing capable of delivery,
which, being the subject of litigation, is held by the party as trustee for another
party, or which belongs or is due to another party, the court may order the same,
upon motion, to be deposited in court or delivered to such party, upon such
conditions as may be just. Money or any other thing deposited into court under
this rule shall be deposited and withdrawn, subject to the further directions of the
court, and as provided by the statutes of this state.
Furthermore, I.R.C.P. 79(e) provides for the reclamation of property following an appeal. That
rule states in relevant part:
At any time after the expiration of the time for appeal, the determination of an
appeal, or the determination of a proceeding following an appeal and the
expiration of the time for any subsequent appeal, whichever is later, any party or
any interested person may apply to the trial court for an order permitting a
reclamation by such party of ... property ... considered in connection with the
action. The trial court in its discretion may grant such an order on such conditions
and under such circumstances as it deems appropriate.. ..
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The court correctly understood that the directive from this Court was limited to determining and
awarding fees to J-U-B for defending against BECO's contract claim. I.R.C.P. 79(e) allows the
district court discretion in granting or denying orders permitting reclamation of property in
connection with an action "under such circumstances as it deems appropriate". Thus, the court's
prerogative that it was inappropriate to release the cash deposit until after it determined the
proper award of attorney fees and released those fees to J-U-B with the remaining balance to
BECO was properly aligned with the court's goal of adhering to this Court's directive.

4.

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
BECO brought and pursued this appeal frivolously, unreasonably, and without foundation

by attacking the credibility and ability of the district court to make its decision without abusing
its discretion. Therefore, J-U-B respectfully requests costs and fees pursuant to I.A.R. 40 and
I.A.R. 41 and Idaho Code 5 12-120(3) and Idaho Code 512-121. Idaho Code 512-121 provides
that "[iln any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing
party.. .." This Court has interpreted I.C. $12-120(3), to mandate the award of attorney fees on
appeal as well as a trial. J.R. Simplot Co. v. Chemetics Int'l, 130 Idaho 255 (1997). As the
prevailing party on appeal, J-U-B requests an award of costs and fees on appeal.

111. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The district court was given very specific instructions from this Court. Those instructions
were to determine and award attorney fees to J-U-B for defending itself against BECO's breach
of contract claim. In order to do that the court had to consider the factors outlined in I.R.C.P.
54(e)(3). The court reached its decision by considering the record before it and argument from
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both sides. The court was intimately familiar with the facts of the case and had already
considered the attorney fee issue once. Thus, after reconsidering the prior award in light of this
Court's instruction, the court properly exercised its discretion and made a reasonable award to JU-B which should be upheld in its entirety with an award of costs to J-U-B.
For all the reasons outlined above, J-U-B respectfully requests that this Court uphold the
judgment for attorney's fees.

,I

a day of October, 2009.
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